4/3: Metaphysics Γ.1-3 (reply)

Aristotle's move from studying being qua to also including the study of its opposites does seem fast, but it reflects his broader claim that science investing opposites as part of understanding their primary subjects and that if metaphysics investigates being, it must also account for non being in some way. This raises a serious question though --> What is the status of non being for Aristotle

It does not seem like non being can be a proper object in its own right. If it truly isn't theres nothing there to study. Still, Aristotle insists that contaries like plurality/unity, sameness/difference and even contradiction fall into within the bounds of this inquiry. This implies that being is not an univocal or simple idea but one that shows up in different categories and with different kinds of rebuttals. The problem comes when Aristotle treats one as equivalent to being and then takes some plurality as its opposite this assumes that the one has the same ontological weight as being itself --> still not obvious that one = being nor that their opposites correlate in the same way.

Is Aristotle's metaphysics obligated to explain non-being in the same way it explains plurality and other contraries? If being admits of contraries like inequality/dissimilarity are these reducible to being vs non being or are they fundamentally different axes of opposition? Questions like this push us to make it clear whether Aristotle things being is a genus with logical opposites or something more foundational that structures how all oppositions can be possible